

## **The State, the Village Commune and the Orthodox Church- Were Technological Change and P.A. Stolypins Land Reform, processes 1890-1914 Consistent with Autocracy?**

### **Introduction**

This chapter discusses the technological innovation enabled institutional change in nineteenth century Russia. Three phenomena are especially focussed upon; the transition to rationalistic thought, pious subversion and democratisation within the mainstream Orthodox Church (Worobec 2001, Freeze Jun. 1996, Shevzov 2004) peasant flight into Old Belief and the secularisation process (Burds J 1998). Those changes had a profound impact on the legitimacy of autocratic government in fin de siècle Russia.

Freeze G. L. (Jun.1996) emphasizes the crucial role of the Orthodox Church as the legitimacy base of the Tsarist autocracy. Besides military defence of the Empires territorial claim, Greek Orthodoxy constituted the most decisive stability pillar of rural collectivism (based on Burds J 1998). The latter condition, as well as the ecclesiastical institutions themselves, reduced the “surveillance costs” of autocratic government (North 1973, Freeze Jun 1996). The question to be elaborated upon in this chapter is; how did the 1890 technological revolution , influence the religious institutions (in the Hodgsonian sense of the term) that constituted the cohesive societal force in the Empire of the Tsars.

Judged from the – during the second half of the nineteenth century dramatically increasing number of “*otkhodnics*” - wage workers on the side of agriculture (Burds, J 1998), it is suggested that railroad construction contributed per force to the *increased mobility* of the Russian peasants. The same conclusion can be drawn from the urbanisation growth rate of the late nineteenth century. The 3.12 % annual growth of the Russian cities 1870-1890 (Ljungberg J 2008) points to an increased migration of labour towards the urban centres. The latter contradicts Gerschenkronian (1968, 1962) proposals and vindicates Paul Gregory’s (1994, 1982). Increased migration, indicates the relatively heavier weight of the “informal habits of mutual beneficence” (Gregory P. 1994) compared to the formal legal constraints, guiding the decisions of the village commune assembly – *skhod* – (Worobec 1995). The latter delineated the intensity of the de facto peasant labour ties to the land (Sztern 1997).

This thesis proposes, that, technological innovation embedded in the railroads, enabling spatial mobility of the Great Russian peasantry, had an *individualising* impact on the post Emancipation 1861, remaining from the serfdom era, communal dimensions of the village custom (Sztern 2007, 2008, 2009 April 1).

The institution of the Mir- village commune<sup>1</sup>, characterised the Russian agriculture (Sztern 2008). The nineteenth century repartitional commune, customary in the Central Black Earth-Czernozem provinces<sup>2</sup>, embodied mutual aid structures (Engelgardt in Frierson 1993, Worobec 1995, Mironov 2000). This institution, in the Hodgsonian sense, had been initially believed to curb revolutionary movements, thus constituting an additional perceived political stability warranty within the Tsarist Empire (Gerschenkron 1962).

---

<sup>1</sup> Volyn L 1970. The term Mir means “the world” and “peace”. During the nineteenth century the concept “Mir” defined a community of former serfs or state peasants, settled as a rule in a single village, although sometimes a village included more than one Mir and conversely several villages could combine in a single mir.

<sup>2</sup> Moon D 1999

The Orthodox Church reconstituted, enforced and fostered commune village cohesion inducing this units' wealth redistributing functions (Worobec 1995, Burds J 1998, applied Hodgson 2004). The commune village system had historically been anchored in the heritage of the patriarchal and tribal institutions (Burds 1998, De Madariaga 1998). *Otkhod*- wage work on the side, process, additionally intensified by the developing railroad network (Westwood 1964, Kahan 1989, Gatrell 1994) made the peasant households and the individual peasants within those, increasingly mutually economically independent (Sztern 2008, 2009 April 1). In the course of the latter process, the importance of the commune's welfare functions had been relatively declining (based on Burds J 1998).

The importance of those functions fluctuated over individuals' lifecycles. The commune's land allotment, mutual help and welfare institutions had been perceived by the peasant proletarians as an insurance against unemployment and old age disability (Johnson 1979, Worobec 1995). Welfare dependence fluctuated over household lifecycles as well (based on Worobec 1995). In the case of the latter, the higher the dependants' proportion, at a given time, the heavier the weight of the communal wealth equalising system and other mutual aid mechanisms, in the households' decision making. The reciprocal help mechanism "*pomoch*" and "*krugovaya poruka*"- mutual responsibility for obligations, historically consolidated the *obshchina* – commune village structure (Worobec 1995, De Madariaga 1998, Mironov 2000).

Increased opportunities for wage work reduced the dependants' proportion, reducing the economic significance of the extended family unit and other forms of rural collectivism. The latter is indirectly verified by the findings made by Cathy Frierson 1990. *The increased, due to intensified construction, peasant populations' proximity to the railroad stations, tended to reduce family size. Thus railroad construction triggering the transition from extended to nuclear family units (Frierson C 1990) enhanced the fully fledged transition towards the individualisation of property and other personal rights .*

Based on archive material, Cristine Worobec (1995) identifies as well, during the post Emancipation and railroad construction era increasing individualism. The latter was manifest through raised frequency of *pre mortem* household divisions<sup>3</sup>. The rural-urban mobility of a nuclear family unit relatively the extended, burdened with high proportion dependent kin, had been higher, a factor influencing the households' long term dependence on the commune (based on Burds 1998). Although the peasant *otkhodnic*-proletarians returned to the native village whilst disabled by ill health or old age (Johnson 1979), the observed rural-urban migration avalanche (Burds 1998), indicates an overall reduced net dependence on the communal welfare. The latter, is consistent with the post Emancipation and industrialisation era, rising living standards of the Great Russian peasantry (Simms Y, Gregory P. 1994, 1982).

The migration streams intensity, varied inversely with the distance from the industrial and the administrative centres (Burds J 1998 p 21). The Central Industrial Region, with Moscow at its apex and six surrounding provinces are said to have held the absolute and proportionally highest number of issued internal passports (ibid). Seen against this background, the railroads, reducing the cognitive (Martens B 2004), and the measured in opportunity cost of the time forgone travelling (based on Engelgardt in Frierson 1993), distance of the periphery to the centre as well as the centre points to each other, per force contributed to increased migration.

---

<sup>3</sup> Worobec 1995 "*pre mortem*" division is the partition of the extended family units' assets before the death of the "*bolshak*" – the head of household.

The increased migration intensity is represented by the internal passports issued to the *growing proportion of the village population* during the post Emancipation decades.

Source: Burds J 1998 *“Peasant Dreams and Market Politics- Labour Migration and the Russian Village 1861-1905”* table1.3 p.23

Peasant Labour Migration as a Proportion of Village Population, 1861-1910

<i>Proportion of Issued Passports to Local Peasant Population</i>						
Regions and Provinces	1861-70	1871-80	1881-90	1891-1900	1902	1906-10
<b>I Nonagricultural/Industrial North and Northwest</b>						
Arkhangel	5.9	13.0	11.3	12.6	14.7	13.8
Vologda	1.8	6.1	6.0	8.2	10.4	10.7
Olonets	3.2	9.1	9.6	12.4	13.4	13.2
St Petersburg	8.6	17.9	21.8	28.9	27.6	23.0
Novgorod	4.5	11.6	10.5	13.1	13.4	14.2
Pskov	2.0	3.3	3.6	6.2	8.7	10.4
Smolensk	6.3	11.2	10.3	11.2	12.6	13.0
Tver	8.0	14.6	14.4	16.7	22.6	23.0
<b>Central Industrial Region</b>						
Iaroslavl	9.1	17.0	16.4	18.9	24.1	23.1
Moscow	10.0	18.0	20.4	29.9	33.9	34.2
Vladimir	4.8	16.0	16.7	19.1	26.1	24.2
Kostroma	3.9	12.3	13.8	13.1	7.6	20.0
Kaluga	8.8	17.2	18.3	20.5	25.8	25.4
Nizhnii Novgorod	3.1	8.8	9.6	11.0	13.1	12.0
Tula	4.2	8.8	9.9	14.3	20.1	20.0
Riazan	5.4	12.7	14.3	17.5	22.7	20.5
<b>Belorussia</b>						
Vitebsk	3.5	5.0	6.0	8.3	10.8	10.9
Minsk	1.1	2.8	4.6	4.9	10.0	4.1
Mogilev	1.6	4.5	5.0	6.0	6.5	9.1
<b>II Southern Agricultural Ukraine</b>						
Poltava	1.4	4.2	5.9	7.0	8.2	6.3
Kharkov	1.2	3.6	5.9	7.2	9.9	9.2
Chernigov	1.4	4.2	5.7	6.9	8.3	8.0
Kiev	0.6	2.5	6.1	8.5	7.2	7.8
Volynia	0.6	2.0	3.2	3.7	0.5	3.2
Podolia	0.4	1.7	3.6	4.2	3.9	4.1
Kherson	1.2	3.3	4.4	4.8	4.8	5.0
Ekaterinoslav	1.2	2.4	3.7	3.9	6.3	3.2
Taurida	1.4	4.2	4.8	4.9	3.8	5.0
<b>North Caucasus</b>						
Don Oblast	0.1	0.5	1.1	2.3	3.7	4.0
<b>III Central Agricultural Central Chernozem</b>						
Voronezh	1.3	5.7	6.1	7.4	8.5	8.0
Kursk	1.8	5.3	7.0	9.2	11.9	10.0

Orel	2.6	5.3	6.7	9.2	11.6	12.2
Tambov	1.9	4.2	4.7	5.9	8.8	8.2
Volga						
Astrakhan	1.9	10.8	15.9	17.6	8.3	9.0
Saratov	0.9	3.8	5.2	6.1	7.7	6.0
Samara	0.4	1.6	1.5	1.9	4.6	3.4
Penza	2.1	6.1	6.2	7.6	10.6	10.0
Simbirsk	1.4	7.5	9.3	8.6	10.8	10.0
Kazan	1.0	5.3	5.6	6.7	9.2	9.2
Viatka	1.5	5.8	6.1	6.9	8.5	.8
Ufa	0.5	1.7	3.2	3.0	3.9	4.3
IV Eastern Agricultural						
Ural						
Perm	0.6	3.2	4.3	6.1	7.5	7.0
Orenburg	1.2	5.6	4.9	4.1	3.9	4.3

In the Non-Agricultural Industrial and Central Industrial Regions, which were the most dependent on the urban wage work occurred outspoken increase in the village population proportion carrying internal passports, during the period 1861-70-1871-80. This is also the period when the railroad construction in the Empire gained momentum. During the decade 1865-1875 the length in kilometres of the Russian railway network grew from 3.845 thousand to 19.029 thousand km (Kahan 1989 Table 1.14 p.30). The Volume of freight in million ton per kilometre, during the same period doubled (ibid). From A Kahans 1989 data it is obvious that the correlation between the intensity of *otkhodnichestvo* – urban wage work migration, measured as million of peasant passengers per km and the annual pace of railways construction in km would be positive. As regards the *direction of causality*, and the *endogeneity problem* (discussion with L.J.Borodkin in Moscow 2008), it is most plausible to assume that the railroads, initially built for military purpose, as well as enhancing the bureaucratic control of the population, unintentionally stimulated increased peasant migration for wage work, rather than the other way around.

Between the years 1861-70 and 1906-10 the proportion of village population that had been given, internal passports in Moscow, increased threefold. It is especially interesting to note that Penza Province located in the Central *Agricultural* Volga region, displays similar passport carrying peasants proportion, growth pattern as the industrial regions, indicating inadequate agricultural productivity. In the Penza Province, where the railroad network had been drawn through in 1874, proportion of village population carrying internal passports grew between the periods 1861-70 – 1871-80 threefold, indicating not only a greater dependence on wage work in the Penza province relative other agricultural regions. The marked peasants' proportion carrying internal passports increase in Penza, in the period during which the railroad had been drawn points to the crucial role of the railroads, for the intensity of peasant wage work migration – *otkhodnichestvo*- the fact that the province is located in proximity to the Volga waterways, notwithstanding. Judged from the Penza statistics, the assumption on the decisive contribution of the newly constructed railway to the increased wage work migration – *otkhodnichestvo*, can not be challenged.

Burds J 1998 referred to above statistics, indicate that the Malthusian crisis allegedly striking the Central provinces, during the industrialisation decades, hypothesis, advanced by Nefedov C.A. and other Soviet historians is fully challengeable (Sztern 1997).

Given the intensity of migration streams, as manifest by the internal passports data, those regions could not have become overpopulated neither in the Leninist nor the Malthusian sense<sup>4</sup>. It is from the Burds (1998) clear, that Alexander Gerschenkron (1962, 1968) overestimated the effect of *past habit and custom control* (Veblen 1913, Hodgson 2004) as well the weight of the Tsarist formal legal restrictions, upon the boundedly rational<sup>5</sup> calculus performed by the commune village assembly *skhod* and underestimated the effect of population increase on the outcome of such calculus (D. Atkinson 1983, Sztern 1997).

The grand scholar derived the proposals on the low mobility of labour, from the rationally expected effect of the land rotation custom- *peredely*, that is the redistribution of land in accordance with the number of “*tyagla*”-labour teams per household (Gaudin C 1998, Worobec 1995). This rule system stipulating the consent of the head of household, *bolshak* and a 2/3 majority vote of the village assembly *skhod*, for an adult sons migration for wage work - *otkhod*, (Gerschenkron 1962, 1968, Burds 1998) would under the rational decision making process tie the peasant labour to the land (Gerschenkron 1962).

Assuming a rational survival calculus performed by the *bolshak* and the *skhod*, in face of population increase, the shrinking per capita land allotment (Atkinson 1983), would result in an increased number of wage work passports issued (Sztern 1997). The actually increasing number of passports issued in all 43 provinces of European Russia (Burds 1998 Table 1.2 p.22 ), indicates the importance of “informal habits” in relation to formal law (Gregory P 1994, 1982) as well as, the *high rationality level, in the neoclassical sense* guiding the decisions of peasant eldest constituency.

The, with the urban wage work rising, literacy levels amongst the peasant proletarians (Burds, 1998, Johnsson 1979, Sztern 2005, Kahan 1989) contributed to the increasing socio economic independence of the younger generation, relative the parent generation household members, presenting the departing for wage work peasant individuals with hitherto unavailable choice opportunities, including those in the *spiritual realm* (Based on Burds 1998).

The increased *otkhodnichestvo* - working on the side – enabled peasant *secularisation* (Burds 1998). Flight from the moral economic obligations, stipulated by the mainstream Orthodox Church, towards the remaining in the commune kin, into *razkol - Staraya Vera* – Old Belief had as well been by the wage work process (Burds 1998). Unlike mainstream Orthodoxy, *Staraya Vera*, the, during the seventeenth century consolidated schismatic movement, as well as the secularised urban ideologies were deeply antagonistic to the perpetuation of the *unchallenged* Tsarist authority. Old Believers constituted the most intensely persecuted by the Tsarist government dissenters community because “*secession from the state’s official religion was viewed as both apostasy and treason*” (Lieven D 2000, p.257).

The mainstream Orthodox, village priesthood preached the sanctity of the patriarchal hierarchy (Hoch 1986, Burds 1998), assisting the Tsarist governmental institutions, such as the police, in enforcing the obligation to repatriate the income earned during *otkhod* – wage work in support of the families in the commune (Burds J. 1998). The urban proletarian had been thereby tied to his native village (*ibid.*). Thus the mainstream Orthodoxy, activating the rural social sanction mechanisms, as well as cooperating with the formal penal system, enhanced the income control of the peasant population in general, and the peasant workers in particular (*ibid.*).

---

<sup>4</sup> Refer to Sztern 1997

<sup>5</sup> Nelson and Winter 1982

The popular, ostensibly voluntary peasant conception of the village commune, as an unemployment and old age ensuring institution (Johnson 1979) had per force been anchored in shaped by the Orthodox church beliefs about the world (applied North D.C. 2005).

Applying the Evolutionary Institutional combined with NIE framework (Sztern 2005), the frequent during the 1906 Stolypin Land Reform implementation, applications by peasant proletarians for a land title, to their allotment in the village commune (Gaudin 1998), reflected a “boundedly rational” (Nelson & Winter 1982) calculus spanning over the individuals lifecycle. It must however be emphasized that a land title application, meant as an insurance against poverty and old age destitution (Gaudin C 1998), carried a long term potential of turning a peasant proletarian and his offspring into agrarian entrepreneurs. The request to become a household head, personal owner of a land allotment (ibid.) should therefore not be mistakenly understood as a collectivist nostalgia or inclination.

As a matter of paradox, acting on behalf of the Tsarist State, and enhancing the repatriation of *otkhodnics*- incomes to the commune, thereby contributing to the legal enforcement of the rural customary way of life, the Orthodox Church seemingly ensuring political stability, caused the rise in the transaction costs of the Tsarist Modernisation (Sztern 2009 April1). The latter process in turn, in the short run increased the transaction- and “surveillance costs” of tax extraction (see also C. Leonard 1990 on serfdom, North 1973, Martens B 2004) weakening the Tsarist State and with it the *involuntary* component of the collectivist rural structure.

To sum up, the imported from Europe technological innovation, the railroads, increased the mobility and migration of labour, which enabled peasant flight into *razkol* as well as *secularisation*, weakening the crucial stability pillar that supported the autocratic government, that is the Orthodox Church (based on Burds 1998, Freeze 1996). The consequent erosion of the spiritual legitimacy base of the Tsarist government made territorial conquest the more crucial. Seen against this background, the debacles in the Crimean campaign and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 marked the beginning of the institutional transformation and the renouncement of the unquestioned Tsarist authority (derived from Freeze 1996, Ascher 1988). The Tsarist Empire embarked on the road to constitutional monarchy (based on ibid.)

### **The Railroad and *Otkhod*, - An Aspect of Cultural Transformation as Contribution to Rising Peasant Individualism**

As above suggested in nineteenth century Tsarist Russia, the novel railroad technology enabled a *diversification of risk to subsistence*, through intensified dependence on non agricultural wage work - *otkhodnichestvo* (Sztern 2008). Moreover, the transaction costs including uncertainty (Coase 1937) of rural-urban migration were greatly reduced due to the availability of the new technology.

Against this background, the introduction of the railroad technology enabling the choice between multiple institutional structures constituted per force a challenge to the patriarchal institutions founding the commune. The costs of collectivism increasingly out weighted the benefits both in the short and the long run calculus (Vanberg 1994). For example, the tribal institution of *krugovaya poruka*- collective responsibility for obligations, (De Madariaga 1998) under the new conditions de facto stipulated that the tax and dues obligations of those households that left the village commune would be redistributed amongst those that stayed behind (Burds 1998).

The due to population increase necessary, and following the industrialisation effort, improved, opportunities for wage work migration, rendering the number of households leaving the commune for permanent urban settlement increasing, bread dissatisfaction with the per household increased tax burden befalling upon those remaining in the village (based on Burds 1998). The attempts on the part of the village commune assembly to hinder individual peasants and whole households rural-urban migration exacerbated *individual internal conflict* and general discontent with the communal organisation (applied Gaudin 1998, Burds 1998). Under conditions of increasing government commitment to, and ability to provide social security, and other welfare services, the rational *raison d'être* of the collectivist communal organisation had been gradually eroded (Sztern 1997, 2000).

Paradoxically the increase in the internal to the village peasant conflict observed at the advent of and during the implementation of the Stolypin reforms (Macey D 1990, Gaudin 1998 ), although unambiguously indicating the *rise of individualism*, rendered the remaining in the village kin households in the short run dependent on the communal and reciprocal communal help mechanisms. The observable amongst the Great Russian peasants *resistance* to the Tsarist government encroachment on the relative rural autonomy (Mironov B 2000), in the course of the Stolypin reform implementation, raising peasant fears of the erosion of the communal welfare and mutual help mechanisms, analysed by Judith Pallot 1999 is not inconsistent, with the intensified transition from rural collectivism to rural-urban individualism.

The 200 years survived by the European Russian peasantry both due to and in spite of the Tsarist State supported collectivist rural structures, rendered parts of the peasant population risk averse (based on Hodgson 2004). The agency effect of the opportunities posed by the availability of the new technology embedded in the industrialisation process is in the long run cumulative. Whilst the entrepreneurial individual risk takers, seized the opportunity presented by the novel technology and broke away, others the more obstinately depended on the known, experienced communal structures. However the higher the proportion of risk takers applying novel survival strategies, within the village population the higher the utility of those strategies to the marginal risk taker, and the higher the probability that the novel strategy will be chosen by the increasingly higher population proportion (applied Boyer and Orlean 1993). Thus the railroads set in motion a self enforcing process of exodus from the village.

The changes in the family relations structured, "*habits of thought*" (Veblen 1931, Lawson 1997) in favour of the individual risk taker – *otkhodnik* - were clearly manifest in the, what Smurova O.V. 2003 labelled – "*smena ideala yunoshi*"- the *transformation of the marriage partner ideal* which occurred in the villages, simultaneously with the industrialisation spurt , the intensified railroad construction and the *otkhod*. The traditional peasant agriculturalist bound to the family and village structure had been increasingly perceived as an inferior choice. The folk songs refrains heralded the advent of the intensified *voluntary transition to the urban and relatively more individualist culture*;

"*Krestianskij syn durashen, on mnogo pashni pashet*"- "*The peasant son is imbecile, he ploughs a lot of plough land*" folk song written down by D Zhvankov, in Soligalicheskij canton the Province of Kostroma quoted in (Smurova O.V. 2003 p.100).

The remaining in the villages traditional peasants received the derogative nickname "*domoleg*" – "*the one that lays at home*" (ibid.). Those became increasingly associated with vulgarity and inflexibility (ibid).

The changed preferences and adjusted prejudices in favour of *sk. Petershchiki*- the worldly dressed increasingly secularised or fervent adherents of *razkol* peasant *otkhodnics* working in the capital, were not in all cases explainable by the material opportunities presented by wage work, writes the source. Whilst the “*domoleg*” could offer the young bride a membership in an established household, the “*Petershchik*’s” wage income was at least in the short run incomparably more uncertain. Moreover, the newly wed women could face long solitary time periods, waiting for the *Petershchik-otkhodnik* to accumulate means adequate for establishing an urban household (Smurova O.V. 2003).

It is legitimate to suggest that the main attraction of the urban wage worker, to a young presumptive village spouse could be found in his *relatively*<sup>6</sup>, *to the way of life in the obshchina village, individualist experience of interacting in the city*, and his therefore increasingly *less hierarchical-patriarchal-authoritarian and more democratically egalitarian* conception of family relations (ibid. p. 102). This supposition is additionally supported by Boris Mironov’s 1999 analysis, stressing the increased demand for *personal rights* observable during the industrialisation spurt of the nineteenth century’s last decades.

The, from 1890 until the advent of First World War observed in Moscow, Vladimir, Riazan, Provinces, increase in criminal cases litigation rate, of which *personal insult* constituted the most frequent complaint, point to an intensifying transition to individualism manifest through the growing sense of individual self dignity among the Great Russian peasantry (Gaudin 2007 table 3-3 p.103, Mironov 1999). It is defensible to emphasise that the demand for personal dignity and freedom had been intensified by *otkhod* not merely through the additional wage income available as a material means, but through the inevitable importation of multiple institutional structures presenting a hitherto unknown challenge to the traditional rural collectivist “habits of thought” (Veblen 1931). The mere process of choice amongst those structures, presented a novel decision component that is, an individualist experience.

It can be suggested that the complementarity as to the effect upon the “habits of thought” of the Emancipation statute of 1861 (Veblen 1931, Hodgson 2004, Sztern 2009 April) and the railroad technology both factors intensifying the *otkhod process, enhanced the demand for individual freedom* as manifest through the transformation of the marriage partner ideal in favour of “*Petershchik*” the urbanized individual risk taker, entrepreneur or proletarian, and away from the traditional patriarchal, collectivist “*krestianin*” – “*domoleg*” home village bound peasant.

The peasant Emancipation from serfdom and the novel technology enhanced cultural transformation processes had been set in motion, nurtured and legitimized by the absorption of, Saint-Simonian ideology within the ranks of the emerging as a societal force in mid nineteenth century, Russian Intelligentsia (Kimball A. 1992, in Timberlake eds 1992). The memoirs of Alexander Herzen “*Past and Thoughts*”, appearing after 1855 in the popular *Poliarnaia zvezda*, although cultivating the romantic conception of going to “*narod*”- the people, criticized the path propagated by the Slavophile beliefs inspired populists (ibid.). Stressing the propriety of irreversibility in history Herzen decried that in the post Emancipation era the service in the Tsarist bureaucracy- *chinovnichestvo*-, the military, or a commercial enterprise-*kupechestvo*- endeavours constituted the preferred by intelligent young men occupational options.

---

<sup>6</sup> Otkhodnics tended to reduce the transaction costs and uncertainty of urban employment, forming “artels” (refer to Sztern 2007) as well as relying on “*zemliachestva*” (Johnson 1979) networks.

Endeavors such as “landowner”, “peasant” or even the “industrial” labourer, were not even mentioned in his societal critique. Those latter occupations were understood by Herzen as belonging to the past (ibid.).

Consequent with the Saint-Simonian thought, Herzen envisioned the Russia of the future guided by an elite of *savants –uchenych- learned men* whose authority steamed neither from hereditary birth right – estate- *soslovie* , nor from the enforced by the autocratic state hierarchy rank- *chin*. Following Herzen Russia’s future depended on its society’s ability to attain a superior developmental stage in terms of a “transition from aristocratism and militarism to egalitarian humanism and peaceful productivity” (Kimball A in Timberlake ed.1992 p.122).

In this leading revolutionary intellectual’s rejection of all the named occupations- the historical as well as the currently preferred- as all of them emanated from the externally bestowed, *privilege based*, formation of either religious or secular hierarchies, per definition implying individual degradation and obedience towards the superior- Herzen came somewhat closer to the ideas of the anarchist leader Prince M.A.Bakunin (1814-76) as evident from the work of the latter titled “*God and the State*”.

However Herzens belief in the superiority of government by *uchenye- learned men*, outspokenly contrary to Bakunin, legitimated in principle the legal domination of men by men, provided the authority and the consequent elite status had been attained through own individual creativity and effort. In the post revolutionary Russia, in place of the churches, the universities would constitute the “networks of communication” (applied Timberlake 1992 in Timberlake ed. 1992) between the rulers and the ruled.

Bakunin’s radical egalitarianism mocked and rejected the idea of the government by a “*scientific academy*”, stressing that “*It is the characteristic of privilege and of every privileged position to kill the mind and the heart of men. That is the social law which admits no exception, and is applicable to entire nations as to classes, corporations and individuals. It is the law of equality the supreme condition of liberty and humanity*” (Bakunin M 1970 p.31).

The peasant cultural transformation (Smurova O.V.2003), enabled by the railroad and *otkhod*, and intensified through urban interaction, manifest in the rejection of the inherited rural, hierarchical and patriarchal structures, that historically redistributed the privilege to surplus and the power to rule to the *bolshak*- head of household (Hoch S. 1986), had been congruent with the ideas and the sentiments nurtured by the Russian Intelligentsia. In Alexander Herzens, as well as Michail Bakunins writings the idea of *ultimate humanism* had been encapsulated in the *egalitarian perception* of human ability and value.

### **The Rule of Law and the Industrialisation- Peasant Transition to Individualism.**

According to the Leninist application of Marx on the social conditions in Tsarist Russia, economic differentiation and class struggle intensifying due to the development of capitalist structures, brought about the demise of the Tsarist State (based on Lenin 1974 “*The Development of Capitalism in Russia*”). Following this logic, the Tsarist effort to modernize Russia, which albeit ambiguously (Sztern 2009 April 1, Kahan 1989, Owen T 1995, 1991) enhanced the development of capitalist structures, destroyed the pillars of autocracy.

The present discourse agrees that the post Emancipation launched, modernization process entailing its unintentional consequences (Sztern 2009 April 1) was inconsistent with autocracy. It is however, proposed that the factors that caused the weakening and the transformation of autocratic structures, were different.

The relations between the peasant and the former landlord were more often than not, symbiotic (P.N. Engelgardt in Frierson C ed. 1993). The literature that explains the revolution of 1905 solely in terms of the antagonistic class relations, oversimplifies the specificities of peasant life in Tsarist Russia. Particularly, the historical intra- and inter-class dependencies, caused by harsh and unstable climatic conditions, deserve attention in this context (Milov 2001, on the frequency of natural calamities Kahan 1985). Moreover, the understanding of the late nineteenth century Russian peasantry as a homogenous community in all respects antagonistic to the Tsarist governmental institutions must be revised (Gaudin C 2007).

Worobec (1990), as well as P.N. Engelgardt in Frierson ed (1993) report on rising individualism, and the consequent, rising values heterogeneity within the peasant milieu.

Stephen P. Frank (1999) and P.N. Engelgardt in Frierson (1993) emphasize the historically established peasant preference for internal to the rural community conflicts resolution mechanisms, such as *reconciliation* and *compensation* rather than formal penalties. Even the custom based, peasant *volost'*- township *courts*, were seen by the rural constituency as instances of last resort, engaged by the peasantry, when the informal conflict resolution mechanisms failed (Frank S. 1999 p 97).

This condition dramatically changed during the industrialisation decades. The direction of institutional change, unambiguously pointing to the rising individualism of the Russian peasant, was, according to the model underpinning this thesis, consistent with the *rising living standards* during the modernisation decades as verified by the research of Simms Y and Gregory P (1994, 1982). Studies of the institutional conditions of the last decades of the nineteenth century, report on the *increasing litigiousness* of the Russian peasantry (Gaudin C 2007). Formal litigation rates, defined as *volost* court cases per 1000 rural inhabitants steadily increased during the period 1891-1911 in the provinces of Central European Russia; Moscow, Novogorod, Riazan, Kursk (Gaudin C 2007 Table 3-1 p 89). The rising litigation rates trend clearly points to weakening collectivist practice in the peasant village and a correspondingly intensifying individualism.

The stratified along estate boundaries structure of conflict, alternatively the conflict structured along the allegedly increasingly differentiated, according to material possessions, peasant classes (on the evidence to the contrary see Löve Heinz-Dietrich 1990) envisioned by the Marxist scholars, is inconsistent with the observed intra estate and intra well to do- as well as the poor strata, rising litigiousness between individuals. The latter process clearly indicates a *disintegrating commune-*, as well as *class cohesion*. It is thus suggested that the pre modern risk internalisation unit, the Mir, atrophied with the increasing peasant trust in the Tsarist jurisprudence (C. Gaudin 2007, Sztern 2000), seen as a representation of the Imperial State structure. This line of argument conforms to the observations made by P.A. Stolypin, as well as P.N. Engelgardt whilst living amongst the Russian peasantry (Klimin 2002). Both eye witness accounts, emphasize rising individualism prior to 1906 Stolypin's land reform.

The rise of individualism suggests in turn that during the late nineteenth century, industrialisation decades, the Tsarist state commenced at internalising the costs of transactions

previously checked by the pre modern *obshchina* community. The rising litigiousness, representing rising individualism, bears evidence of the ongoing “transition from community to society” (Mironov 2000). Referring to the concepts advanced in Raeff M (1984) and Szttern (1997) the increased intra commune litigation rate suggests that *the Tsarist Empire tacitly embarked on the transition from personalised to impersonalised institutions*, in the long run reducing the costs of transaction in the system as a whole, whilst increasingly including the peasants of European Russia in the Imperial State structures (derived from Raeff 1984, Hartley 1999, Yaney 1973).

Thus, concluding from Gaudins (2007) findings, the turn of century peasant constituency had been characterised by a *weakening* estate and class cohesion and an increasing *intra* estate and class conflict. This conclusion is additionally vindicated by D Macey’s (1990) research. The latter ultimately challenges the Marxist interpretations.

Gaudins (2007) and D Macey’s (1990) findings are consistent with the analysed by Freeze (1996) widening schism between the Church and the Tsarist state. As regards enhancing the viability of the autocratic - *samoderzhavie* (De Madariaga 1998) state structure, *the declining authority of mainstream Orthodoxy paved the way for future participatory government structures*.

Following the Law of 9 November 1906<sup>7</sup> the peasants, far from constituting the timid “property unconscious” (Crisp O 1989) masse manipulated and exploited by the Tsarist state (inspired by Gerschenkron 1962), in fact manifested a sophisticated landed property conscious, opportunistic attitude as to the choice between the civil code based imperial institutions and the relatively custom based *volost*-township courts rulings, for conflict resolution on the right to land titles (C. Gaudin 1998). As above suggested, an increasing peasant engagement of the Tsarist governmental judicial system indicates an amongst the Russian peasantry relatively rising trust level pertaining to those institutions. Thus, the level of “*grazhdanstvennost*”- the perception of citizenship within the rural constituency had been gradually increasing in accordance with the objectives and the ethos of the 1906 Land Reform.

---

<sup>7</sup> Gaudin C. 1998 p. 747, Formally the law of the 9 of November 1906 allowed the heads of households to claim their *nadel*- share of the communal land as their personal property, and, or to enclose it, in a single parcel. The novel institution granted the individual applicants for a land title, legal *autonomy from the decisions of the village assembly the skhod*. The latter institution ( in the Hodgsonian 2004 sense) had previously been shaping the household use rights in land, varying the size of the lad allotment *nadel* in accordance with the number of labour teams “*tyagla*” per household. Thus, following Stolypin Land Reform, the subsequent slow adaptation of the “habits of thought” (Veblen T 1931) would hypothetically render land rotation during redistributions, *peredely* gradually declining. Moreover, the land of departing households would no longer return to the commune. Thus the household head land title, constituted the formal foundation of a transition to *hereditary family farm* system. Conditional land allotments could at any time be claimed as the household head, personal property. The application for a land title – *ukreplenie*- appropriation, formally embodied the household transition from the collectivist risk sharing and mutual aid system of the village commune (Scott 1976, Eggertsson T 1990) to the individualism of a hereditary family farm. ( based on eudin p. 751). The main restriction distinguishing the former allotment land from the gentry’s private property was the prohibition to sell the parcel to a non peasant. After the Law of the 14 of June 1910, an individual could purchase maximum six parcels. The legislation specified that the purchase of allotment land also entailed a transaction concerning the villages common resources, such a pasture - and wood lands . Thus the village assembly *skhod* control over the redistribution of common resources weakened, additionally heralding the transition to individualism in the landholding system.

The steadily rising number of civil complaints filed per 1000 inhabitants between the years 1891-1913 (Gaudin C. 2007 table 3-4 p104) and the 1903-1913 increasing total case load proportion of suits over land (ibid. Table 3-5 p.108) clearly points to the fact that the *informal institutional transition from collective use rights in land to householdhead-bolshak property, temporally predated* with at least one and a half decade the formal transition to individualism in the landholding institutions codified in the Stolypin Land Reform of 1906 (applied North 1990). J. Pallots 1999 analysis of the peasants' dependence on the commune and collectivist resistance to the Stolypin reform can not be conceived of as supported by Gaudins 2007 findings.

Seen in the Evolutionary Institutionalism perspective the Emancipation Act of 1861 shaped and reconstituted the peasant "habits of thought" (Veblen 1931, Hodgson 2004) enabling an outspoken *increasing demand for individual personal rights* (Mironov 1999, Sztern 2009 April 1).

The latter is also verified by the post Emancipation rising, criminal cases litigation trends (Gaudin C Table 3-3 p.103). Thus, not only, the civil cases litigation rates, markedly increased 1891-1911 (Gaudin C. 2007 Table 3-4 p. 104) whilst enhanced by the industrialisation spurts. In the European Russian provinces; Tver, Riazan, Novgorod, Vladimir, and Moscow, the criminal cases litigation rates dramatically increased between 1897-1903, declined somewhat during the Russo Japanese war, the 1905 Revolution and the second industrialisation spurt of 1907, to increase steadily again until the advent of the First World War. Of the criminal cases the heaviest load throughout European Russia, constituted *accusations of insult* (Gaudin C 2007p.103).

Gaudins C (2007) above referred to findings are fully consistent with Mironov (1999) analysis. The latter emphasizes the intensified demand for personal rights, and a newly acquired sense of individual dignity manifest within the ranks of the European Russian peasantry. Gaudins' (2007) research as well as Worobecs (1995), the latter, disclosing the increased frequency of pre mortem household divisions, advises that, during the last decades of Tsarism, the demand for individually delineated rights to movable material possessions as well as landed property, increased, as manifest through the proportion of such cases of the total case load (Gaudin C Table 3-5 p.108). In Riazan, Moscow, Tver, and Vladimir, provinces, proportion pertaining to suits over land outspokenly increased. The same was true of suits on family divisions and inheritance (ibid.).

The combined NIE and Evolutionary Institutionalism framework points to the ongoing in the course of the 1906 Stolypin land reform – transformation of the governmental judicial institutions affecting the peasant attitudes and vice versa. Interpreted in the above perspective, *the individualisation of the rights to land title could not have been alien to the traditional institutions of the Great Russian peasant*. This proposition challenges J. Pallots emphasis upon the relative viability and stability of the collectivist aspects of the rational peasant life strategies (Pallot, J 1999). The Kingston Mann (1991) analysis focusing on the intra household transactions compensating individual household investments in land at the times of *peredely* – repartitions indicates, that the nineteenth century *obshchina* increasingly transformed into a unit of voluntary cooperation between independent and individualist agrarian entrepreneurs. The latter is also verified by P.N. Engelgardts eye witness accounts.

Following Gaudins (2007) empirical research 1906 Stolypins Land Reform was per force fully consistent with the genuine peasant demand for an individualisation of all civil rights

including the rights to landed property (Sztern 1997), and not a process imported from Germany to the Euroasian Empire and implemented by sheer coercion upon the peasant commune (ibid).

It is proposed that such demand was manifest prior to and during the revolution of 1905, reflecting an unambiguously positive peasant attitude to land ownership (Sztern 1997, Zakharova L.G. 1992). Against the above background, the transition to personal, household head property right stipulated in the 1906 Stolypin reform from the collective-communal rotating and redeemable use rights, set in the Emancipation agreement, can be conceived of as a predominantly voluntary process, as envisioned by P.A. Stolypin himself (Klimin 2002). The Soviet scholar Dubrovskii (1963), informs of peasant petitions for land title in the provinces of European Russia markedly increasing from 212 000 in 1907, to 840 000 in 1908, levelling off at 650 000 in 1909. As proposed above, the Evolutionary Institutionalist line of reason, suggests that the observed outspoken interest in personal landed property, discloses the historically present individualist dimensions of the village commune structure (Sztern 2007 Kingston Mann E 1991), that reconstituted and predisposed the peasant (Hodgson 2004), *enabling the individual agriculturalist to seize the opportunity presented by the novel legislation and acquire the land title*. The assumption on the continuity of a collectivist mentality of the Russian peasant, a notion nurtured in the Western debate is thereby unambiguously challenged.

Moreover the observable *rationalism* of the peasant constituency ultimately challenges proposals emanating from the assumption on the collectivist Slavonic mentality permeating the Slavophile nineteenth century writing (refer to Sztern 2000). Given the manifest in the second half of the nineteenth century *peasant individualist inclination*, the rural land holding institutions' interaction with the industrialisation spurt of the 1890, the thereby increased *otkhodnichestvo*, ensuring declining risk to perish of starvation due to a crop failure, at an era when the Tsarist government had been increasingly enabled to employ the railroads as the instrument of famine relief, explain the phenomenon. The occurrence of this the above depicted process is empirically verifiable by the growing incidence of individualist civil cases litigation (Gaudin 2007).

The litigation rate concerning the criminal cases increases (Gaudin table 3-3 p.103) points to the development of a more nuanced definition of what had been perceived as a criminal offence, and how such offence should be equilibrated. An empirical investigation may indeed indicate a gradually albeit slowly declining incidence of “*samosud*” (this practice had been documented by Worobec 2001 and Frierson spring 1987) in the Russian villages during the last decades of Tsarism. Although Worobec (2001) points out that the frequency of “*samosud*” – an often grotesquely brutal social sanction- in this context, related to the phenomenon of the alleged possession- *klikushestvo*- had not been affected by the proximity to the railroad points, it is legitimate to assume that the distance to the railroad and the thereby intensified rural – urban cognitive exchange (Martens 2004) would have a slow and enduring long term effect.

Additional argument, challenging the Marxist interpretation is found in Gaudin 1998.

The heads of households that primarily petitioned for separation of their allotment land from the commune, thus establishing a personal property based farm, could not be characterised as a homogenous group of well to do household heads (refer to Worobec 1990). The Marxist-Leninist framework of analysis is challenged by the fact that it had been the “marginalized groups”; widowed female heads of households and absentees- *otkhodnics*- wage workers

employed in urban industries who risked to lose their right to an allotment within the commune at the next *repartition*, that petitioned for a land title in order to secure an ensuring over the life cycle access to landed property (Gaudin C 1998).

The, during Stolypin reform implementation, intensifying individual intra commune conflict over the newly available landed property title, that transformed the previously enforced collectivist, village cohesion, in principle challenges the Marxist assumptions on class formation within the peasant estate and the transformation of the estate into class, as well as the populist postulates on the impossibility of individual capitalist institutions in Russia. ( based on Macey D 1990, Gaudin C 1998, 2007, Atkinson D 1983 )

As regards the inter estate cultural gap concerning the peasant utilisation of the judicial governmental institutions, Burbank J (2004) suggests that the relation between peasant custom and the civil code should be understood as continuous rather than discrete and dichotomous. The de facto inter estate cultural boundary had been increasingly blurred and the inter-estate cultural gap had been, due to intensified railroad function, declining over time (refer to Sztern 2008, Crafts N 2007 lecture, Martens B 2004 ).

The rising peasant general litigiousness (Gaudin 2007) and the *dramatic increase in the proportion of cases concerning landholding*, of the civil case load 1901-1913, (Gaudin 2007 Table 3-5 p. 108) as well as the rising proportion of the cases concerning *family divisions and inheritance* unambiguously point to the increasingly manifest *individual property consciousness* amongst the Russian peasantry, simultaneous with the rising trust level in the governmental structures. It must be emphasized that the *timing* of the process vindicates the hypothesis advanced in Sztern 1997, that the *intensifying property consciousness* and transition to individualism of the Russian peasant *temporally predates* the codification of the Law of the 9 of November 1906- that is the Stolypin reform. Thus the Reform itself can be seen as a codification ex post of an ongoing process.

Which factors contributed to this institutional transformation?

The judicial reform of 1864 and the consequent professionalization of the judicial system strengthening the predictability of law enforcement, paved the way for an increased reliance of the society as a whole on the governmental justice warranty (based on Gaudin 2007, Burbank J 2004, Hodgson 2004 applied). Moreover, the establishment of a public representation body the First Duma of 1906 channelled the public discourse into acceptable by the state and the society formal forum, per force lowering the repression level, thereby increasing the citizen vs. the state trust , which reduced the transaction costs of law enforcement (based on Ascher 1988 ).

Studying P.N. Engelgardt it becomes evident that the mutually dependent physical and cognitive distance (applied Martens B 2004, Crafts N lecture 2007) of the peasant to the custom based *volost* court as well as the civil code based, imperial court institutions, historically constituted one of the vital motives for the preference for the informal, internal to the community conflict resolution practice.

The fear of the discriminatory, and degrading treatment by the governmental institutions coupled with the perceived opportunity cost of working time forgone, whilst travelling to the court room deterred both plaintiffs and witnesses from engaging the Tsarist judicial system (based on P.N. Engelgardt in Frierson 1993, Frank S 1999).

The technological innovation embedded in the railroads in practice affected downward the opportunity cost of travelling, “shortening” the physical and thereby the cognitive distance of the peasant to the *volost*- court as well as to the imperial court room. Thus the new technology implementation lowered the insecurity in law enforcement, encouraging an additional interaction of the peasant constituency with the Tsarist governmental institutions, rendering those latter instances transformed. The railroads enabling the engagement of the judicial system by the peasantry, contributed per force to an *increased equality before the law*, encouraging additional engagement. Increasing the institutional transformation of the peasant estate, as well as the elites’, abolished the cultural estate boundaries prior to the October revolution and the Bolshevik take-over.

### **The Challenge of Railroad Technology to the Religious Pillar of Political Stability in Late Imperial Russia – The Transformation of the Orthodox Church.**

Alexander Gerschenkrons’ (1962) analysis advises that, during the Post Emancipation Era, the village commune structure had been revitalised, by the Tsarist State, for political stability reasons. The functions previously performed by the landlord, such as the tax collection, control of family structure, responsibility for law and order, were after the Emancipation of the serfs, transferred to the jurisdiction of the village commune assembly – *skhod* (Atkinson D 1983, Mironov 2000).

This analysis seems partial. As the peasants constituted roughly 80 % of Tsarist Russian population, the commune could not have been consolidated by government coercion alone. The nineteenth century village commune collectivist, organisational structure, rested on one of the primary stability pillars supporting the Tsarist Empire, namely the *Byzantine Church* (Burds J 1998).

Formally, since Petrine times, the relation between the Tsarist State and the Orthodox Church had been that of a tightly knit symbiosis. The church enjoyed financial subsidies, and protection of its monopoly on proselytizing (Timberlake 1992 in Timberlake ed 1992 p 11). Most important, state organs including the police were obliged by law to prosecute all subjects, who “*by word or by deed*” challenged Greek Orthodoxy (ibid.). Legally, the Russian Emperor was “*the supreme defender and preserver of the dogmas of the ruling faith, and protector of the purity of belief and the decorum of the holy Church*” Curtiss quoted in (ibid.). In exchange for this protection by the Tsarist State, the Orthodox Church *legitimized* the Imperial structure, proclaiming the Russian Tsar as “the Divinely anointed” (ibid.). The coronation of each new monarch, including, Nicolaus the II 1894, centred on the anointment ceremony, taking place in the Uspenskii Cathedral (ibid). As the Tsar was thus conceived as an intermediary between God and people, the monarchs rule was to be accepted by all subjects as a Divine agency, rendering any discourse or opposition a religious sacrilege. The Orthodox clergy had been obliged to report on any conspiring against autocracy, even if the information had been obtained during confessional. As the decrees and the statutes were proclaimed by the, relatively the peasantry, more literate clergy, during religious service, the churches de facto served as a “communication network for the Tsar and his government” (Timberlake Ch.E. in Timberlake Ch.E. ed. p. 11)

The implications of the institutionalised dependence of autocratic government- the Tsarist *samoderzhavie* (De Madariaga 1998) upon religious authority, can not be fully understood without reference to the work of one of Russias’ most dynamic intellectuals; Prince Michael

Bakunins “*God and the State*”. Applying Bakunins Pan-humanitarian analysis, to the specific conditions in Tsarist Russia, the *consecration* of the, per force oppressive and despotic State structure by the Orthodox Church constituted the source of ultimate human degradation and retardation (refer to Sztern 2009 April 1) or to use the Gerschenkronian term of institutional “backwardness” (refer to Sztern 1997).

“Christianity is precisely the religion par excellence, because it exhibits and manifests, to the fullest extent, the very nature and *essence of every religious system, which is the impoverishment, enslavement, and annihilation of humanity for the benefit of divinity.....*God being master men is the slave.....whoever says revelation says revealers, messiahs, prophets, priests, and legislators inspired by God himself; and these once recognised; as the representatives of divinity on earth as the holy instructors of humanity, chosen by God himself; to direct in the path of salvation, *necessarily exercise absolute power*. All men owe them passive and unlimited obedience; for against divine reason there is no human reason, and against the justice of God no terrestrial justice holds. *Slaves of God, men must also be slaves of Church and the State, in so far as the State is consecrated by the Church*” (Bakunin M 1970 p.24”)

This radical statement notwithstanding Bakunin elsewhere in “*God ad the State*” does not reject nor deny the insight that the history of religious beliefs reflects the “*development of collective intelligence and conscience of mankind*” (ibid. p.23). Thus, religiousness as such constitutes a necessary stage in human development. The ultimate goal of the latter process is the attainment of individual dignity and liberty. Bakunins’ vision of the *ultimate rebellion*; the *rejection of all hierarchy, all domination of men by men, the demand for absolute egalitarianism*, reflects an aspect of the general sentiment that albeit to a notably differing degree, inspired other, including clerical radical movements, in nineteenth century Russia (Freeze G.L. 1999 in Geifman A 1999).

The interaction between the modernisation process entailing technological change, launched by the Tsarist autocracy and the latter institutions ongoing dependence upon the religious structures, paradoxically and unintentionally caused the radicalisation and egalitarianism oriented institutional change within the religious legitimacy base (Shevzov 2004, Freeze G.L. 1999). Those mechanisms, forced the gradual transformation of autocracy into constitutional monarchy (Ascher 1998).

It seems that Michael Bakunin the leader of the anarchist intelligentsia rather than Carl Marx (the Russian landless proletariat constituted 5 % of the population, (refer to Sztern 1997)), illuminated and defined in his writings the type of *individualist to its character heterogeneous rebellious force* directed at the secular and the religious main stream *hierarchy*, that drove forward the institutional transformation of the Orthodox Church as well as the Autocratic State towards a modernized pluralist Russian society. The latter increasingly came into being before the First World War. The technological innovation; railroad construction embedded in the State led industrialisation process, that set the whole nation in motion contributed an irreversibility condition to the process of democratising societal change.

The weaker was the secularised legitimacy base of the autocratic governance system, the more the Tsarist State aimed to lean on the spiritual legitimacy foundation provided by the church (Freeze, Jun 1996). The government launched industrialisation process, in the reign of Nicolaus the II brought with it in the short run a *perceived* economic plight of the peasantry. The famine of 1891 and the economic depression of 1901-3, bread dissatisfaction with the

ruler, whilst the Empires “power in international affairs” (ibid.) had been greatly eroded both by the debacle in the Crimean War and in the Russo Japanese campaign of 1904 (ibid.). Moreover, the persona of the last Russian monarch had been devoid of all charisma. Thus the secularised stability blocks; “*the person of the ruler, perceived prosperity, and relative power status in international affairs*” (ibid), were at the end of the nineteenth century inadequate for ensuring the political stability of the Empire. The latter condition augmented the importance of the ecclesiastical and spiritual legitimacy base (ibid).

It is in this context imperative to elaborate upon the *vicious circle and consequences of conquest*, upon the reliability of the Greek Orthodox legitimacy base for the perpetuation of autocracy. Historically, the periodically, relatively increased secularized “power in international relations” (Freeze 1996) manifest due to the imported from Western Europe technological ability of the Imperial army to secure territorial claim (refer to Sztern 2009 April 1) gathered under the wings of the Tsarist autocracy a host of non Orthodox populations (Timberlake 1992 in Timberlake 1992 eds). The latter phenomenon, although seemingly strengthening the Empires secularised legitimacy base, in the long run posed twofold danger to the stability of the autocratic government. The future of the Empire became on one hand endangered by the spiritual challenge to the loyal to the Russian Tsar Orthodox Church as regards the type of Christianity practiced by the conquered peoples and the national - political disloyalty of the new subjects to the Russian crown. A long run vicious circle can be identified where territorial conquest weakening the loyal to the Tsarist crown spiritual legitimacy base in fact necessitates additional strengthening of the secularised legitimacy base through conquest. Thus in figure form;

Fig I

### *The endemic necessity of conquest for the preservation of autocracy*



Judged from the, in the second half of the nineteenth century, markedly increased frequency of canonisations in which the Imperial family took an active part and even an initiating role, the Tsarist State aimed at the “*resacralisation*” of autocratic rule (Freeze 1996 p 311). The analysis of Gregory L Freeze 1996 proposes that the Tsarist strategy attempting to use religious rites for political purpose begot unintended consequences, consolidating *pious subversion* within the ranks of the main stream Orthodox Church. Contrary to the implications of Alexander Gerschenkrons’ analysis and the expectations suggested by the Marxist theory, Orthodox Church did not necessarily constitute a relatively reactionary force and the Tsarist State was not necessarily in all respects the progressive, moderniser (based on Freeze 1996).

For example the canonisation of Serafim Sarovskii (1760 -1833) in 1902 an obscure and renouncing church hierarchy, humble, egalitarian monk, who proclaimed a bright future to the court of Nicolaus the II, an event *initiated by the Imperial Family* in spite of the scepticism of

the Holy Synod, had been aimed at enhancing the “*unity between the tsar and the people*”. At the site of the event, the hierarchy structuring the massive pilgrims gathering unintentionally revealed to the religious masses, the actual value systems nurtured by the Imperial Court. The latter overtly breed the cultural and material rift between the ruling elites and the pious pilgrims. Contrary to the Tsarist intentions and expectations, the canonisation of Serafim disclosed and deepened the estrangement between the tsar and the people. Influenced by the radicalisation of its constituency, the mainstream Orthodox Church increasingly came to fuel *pious dissent* and *subversion* rather than obedience, to the crown (Freeze 1996, Freeze 1999 in Geifman A 1999).

The railroad technology, enabling distant pilgrimages, and unprecedentedly massive gatherings at the canonization of the saints events, enabled manifestations of the popular pious dissent on a scale hitherto unknown. The latter per force constituted a credible threat form below (Greif 2006) inducing and pressuring the Tsarist government to democratising concessions.

Acknowledging the weight of religious beliefs in the peasant way of life, any analysis of the relative vitality of the, nineteenth century peasant collectivism, necessitates a closer look at the institutional transitions taking place within the realm of the Orthodox Church, which initially consolidated the commune (Burds 1998). The inner institutional re evaluations are explained by the challenge to the mainstream Orthodox hegemony posed by the *Schismatics* and other sectarians as well as the secularisation process gaining momentum during the last decades of Tsarism (Treadgold 1968 in Vucinich S.W. ed.1968, Sztern 1997).

*The tensions within main stream Orthodoxy arise simultaneously with the industrialisation spurt of the 1890 entailing intensified railroad construction and the consequent intensified peasant migration for wage work to urban centres as well as pious pilgrimages to remote and obscure monasteries.* The attractive secularized ideologies, such as the Union of Liberation and Socialist Revolutionary, as well as an intensified peasant flight to Old Belief – *Razkol* – a movement that was more often than not antagonist towards the Tsarist State, in combination posed a credible and subsequently realised threat of a an upheaval, challenging the main stream Orthodox Church.

As above argued, the latter institution, from the outset fostering peasant collectivism, had been challenged by the late nineteenth century rise of the *spiritual and material individualism* (Burds 1998, Shevzov 2004, Mironov B 1999, Gaudin 2007). This proposition as regards the material dimension is verified by the rise in the litigation over land cases rate (Gaudin C. 2007). The spiritual individual choice was reflected by increased *otkodnics*’ voluntary flight into *razkol-starovery-starobriadcy* i.e. the Schismatic Old Belief (Burds 1998, Treadgold 1968 in W.S. Vucinich 1968). *It should be emphasized that the spiritual choice had not been made on village- but on the individual level heralding progressive future development.*

It is of great interest to learn in this context that the Bishop of Volokolamsk and the dean of Moscow Theological Academy expressing his concerns in the revolutionary year 1905, prior to the implementation of Stolypins land reform and the individualisation of landholding, observed; “*one of the most characteristic traits of our time is that the individual “lichnost”, previously strongly suppressed, now unreservedly strives forward in his or her development and self expression*” (Shevzov2004, p. 13).

The rise of “*beztserkovnoe khristianstvo*”- “churchless Christianity”, during this period, where the larger ecclesiastical order and community, were no longer essential to salvation, constituted an additional challenge to the traditional Orthodoxy (ibid.).

The pious dissent presented by the *schismatics*, especially the Old Believers must therefore be seen as causally related to the *increasing revival of an egalitarian doctrine, and transition to democratic piety* within the main stream ecclesiastical system, (based on Shevzov 2004, Burds,J 1998). Moreover, the laws of 17 April 1905 and 17 October 1906 that established religious tolerance, legalising Old Belief and other “sectarian” practice, marked the advent of an emerging pluralist society in Tsarist Russia. Those latter Tsarist concessions aimed at restoring law and order, also suggest that the revolution of 1905 was not primarily motivated by material impoverishment (Sztern 1997). The common denominator between Stolypin Land Reform of 1906 and the institutions granting freedom of faith implemented a year earlier is the acknowledgment of all individual civil rights hitherto formally unknown in Tsarist Russia.

The depth of the institutional transformation set in motion by the industrialisation entailing the *otkhod* process, can not be over estimated. The individualisation of peasant customary structures had been shaped and moulded by the “*democratisation taking place within the ecclesiastical system*” (Shevzov 2004, applied Hodgson 2004).

Historically, the hierarchical, structured on clerical and even civil officials’ authority preaching to, and monitoring the religious habits of the *obedient* laity, ecclesiastical system, that legitimized the autocratic Tsarist State, had been established during Peter the Great, and codified in the *Spiritual Regulation of 1721*<sup>8</sup>. The following quotation from the Spiritual Regulation discloses that the Petrine State tolerated neither autonomous ecclesiastical authority, nor any formal institutional recognition of a faith community (Shevzov 2004):

“... *common people do not understand how spiritual authority is distinguishable from the autocratic ...they imagine that such an administrator is a second Sovereign, a power equal to that of the Autocrat, or even greater than he ...*” (Shevzov 2004 p. 16)

Formally, the Spiritual Regulation constituted the institutional foundation legitimizing the Tsarist Empire from Petrine times until the October Revolution of 1917.

During the last decades of the nineteenth century, simultaneously with and due to the 1890 industrialisation spurt, intensified peasant wage work migration, the Byzantine structure, identifying laity with the profane, that is the things of “this world”, and the peasantry with “the dark masses”, in contrast to the ordained, spiritually superior and leading clergy, represented by the ober-procurator of the Holy Synod K.P. Pobedonostsev, had been informally, through emerging internal debate affected by an older and egalitarian *church-community-gathering-“sobornost”* conception which defined the parish laity as well as the clergy as the “*People of God*” that is *as equal before God* (Shevzov 2004 ). During the same period the Tsarist State of Nicolaus II and the Orthodox Church increasingly parted ways (Freeze 1996).

---

<sup>8</sup> Concerning the relation between the clergy and the laity, the Spiritual Regulation was heavily influenced by the conception of the Bishop Feofan Prokopovich (1681-1736) trained at the Kievan Academy, that was strongly influenced by the Roman Catholic, Jesuit teachings. (Shevzov 2004 p. 18)

The intra ecclesiastical debates 1905-1917, concerned Orthodoxys very identity. *Counter to Marxist intuition, the competing visions, transgressed both the social and the ecclesiastical class lines*. Liberalising reforms were often proposed by the bishops whilst the laity represented the conservative adversary (Shevzov 2004 p. 14).

Thus, the Orthodox establishment perceiving the spiritual challenge posed by the individual choices enabled due to industrialisation, fearing rootlessness in its own constituency, competed for the hearts and minds, according to the accusations of its conservative adversaries, through *absorbing “republican” ideas* (ibid.).

Whilst the contemporary *secular* press *Ruskii Vestnik*, *Moskovskie Vedomosti*, defended conservative positions, the ecclesiastical journals; *Bogoslovskii Vestnik*, *Tserkovnyi Vestnik*, were accused of absorbing into the Tsarist Empire the same ideas that fuelled the French Revolution (ibid.). The transition to an egalitarian conception of the parish was as to its urgency perceived, as compatible with the Emancipation of the Serfs Act of 1861 (ibid. p. 15).


Moreover, even the Orthodox attitudes towards *superstition* during the closing decades of the nineteenth century markedly liberalized. The increased tolerance towards this practice encapsulated challenge to the mainstream religious authority (Shevzov 2004).

This liberalisation may explain the paradox of *klikushestvo*-perceived demon possession-amongst the peasants and the consequent “*samosud*”- extra judicial peasant penal system, the vengeance directed at the alleged witches and the sorcerers, processes that were seemingly unsusceptible to the effects of the proximity of the urban culture attained through the increasing proximity to the railroad points (Worobec 2001). As those practices, as well as sectarian dissent were increasingly tolerated, by the ecclesiastical and the Imperial system, the inducement to conceal *klikushestvo* declined, raising the number of reported cases, whilst the increased ability to travel to remote monasteries for exorcism i.e. miraculous cure increased, possibly encouraging this type of *religious dissent*.

It is of interest to note that the industrialisation process, with the railroad construction at its core enhanced as well the *transition to pious rationalism*, within the realm of the modernising and democratising Orthodox Church (Worobec 2001, Shevzov 2004). Challenged by the urban culture inspired, secularisation, *klikushestvo* phenomenon became by the Orthodox clerics increasingly conceived of as *cases of hysteria*, hesitantly opening the door to the acceptance of the matter of fact that the victim might recover due to medical treatment (Worobec 2001). This progressive gesture notwithstanding the Orthodox Church, perceived the *miraculous cure* offered as one of its central functions (Worobec 2001).

FigII

Summarising Figure



## **The Peaceful Monarchy – Peasant Individualism Codified in Stolypin's Land reform of 1906 and its Implications for the Future of Autocratic Rule.**

The proposal to modernize the Tsarist Russian agriculture, codifying the formal dissolution of the village commune "*obshchina*" through the delineation of *personal household head property rights in land* (Gaudin 2007, Yaney 1982, Pallot 1999, 1982) constituted a formal institutional novelty. The Stolypin reform of 1906 can be interpreted as congruent with the civil rights oriented spirit of the 1905 laws on the individual freedom of faith as well as with the rising egalitarianism and the consequent democratisation "from within", transforming the end of nineteenth century Russian Orthodoxy. According to the long run objective of the 9 November 1906 law, the individual heads of households would, in their decision making, be formally freed from the paternalism of the elder-*starosta* structure. The latter had become bureaucratized in the Post Emancipation 1861 communes (Mironov B 2000 p 330). Thus the Stolypin reform constituted a Tsarist concession, heralding a future retreat of state bureaucracy from the countryside. Atkinson D 1983 refers to this, formally legalised exit form the village commune as the "second Emancipation" of the Russian peasantry.

On government level, the Stolypin reform of 1906, introducing the individualisation of right to landed property, including the right to trade such property within the peasant estate-"*soslovie*", had been motivated by two dominating political stability concerns. The reform aimed at developing the sense of citizenship "*grazhdanstvennost*" (ibid) of the peasant *bolshak*-head of household, through persuading the masses that loyalty to the Tsarist crown, was economically rational. Conforming to the, during the nineteenth century, nurtured agricultural doctrines, the individualisation of landed resource control and ownership would pave the way for productivity increases and the ultimate amendment of peasant poverty (Yaney 1982). In the long run, the reform would ensure the abolition of the hitherto, to a regionally varying degree, practiced by the peasants in European Russia, periodic land redistribution schemes. The process would thereby enhance the transition from extensive to intensive land use system (based on Yaney 1982, Gerschenkron 1962, Nafziger S 2007, Sztern 1997). Whilst the law of 1893 banned frequent land redistributions, stipulating a minimum interval of 12 years, ideally, the land reform would abolish this practice altogether (ibid).

From the view point of the Tsarist government, the transition from collective, redeemable use rights in land stipulated in the Emancipation Act of 1861 to individual household head *property right* was perceived as having an *instrumental value*, for the preservation of *samoderzhavie*-autocracy (De Madariaga 1998). Facing the 1904 battlefield debacle (Menning W.B. 2000) and an increasingly radicalised ecclesiastical constituency (Freeze in Geifman ed.1999), the Tsarist autocracy aimed at strengthening its "*secularised legitimacy base*" (Freeze, Jun 1996) *by peaceful means* (Ascher A 2001).

The uniqueness of Petr Arkadevich Stolypin's, prime minister, and minister of internal affairs 1906-1911, reform proposal lay in the idea that improving the lot of the peasantry, would stabilise the Empire's legitimacy base *without* engaging Russia in territorial conflict (ibid.). In face of the disastrous outcome of the 1904 Russo Japanese war, Stolypin deemed the prospect of armed conflict, decisively unfavourable to the future of the Tsarist monarchy (ibid.). Thus, unlike the, on the part of the Tsarist state, previously launched modernisation spurts, the Land Reform of 1906 was *not* primarily intended to serve the needs of warfare (refer to Sztern 2009 April 1).

Stolypins' views on the superiority of the individual household as opposed to collective landed resource management and ownership had been inspired by the observations made of German farming (Asher 2001). The Tsarist Prime minister was neither a constitutionalist nor a liberal. He nurtured an authoritarian devotion to the Tsarist monarchy as well as to the Orthodox Church (ibid). Whilst the leftist intellectuals opposed the 1906 Land Reform deeming the institution an attempt at maintaining the centralised autocratic order, the extreme right opposed the same process, fearing that the reform would bring about fundamental alterations in the prevailing social and economic systems, thus endangering the political stability of the Empire (ibid.). As will be argued below, the latter arguments deserve some attention. The spatial, leading to structural implications of the transition to individualism in landed property, were inconsistent with the perpetuation of autocratic rule. As regards government objectives, Stolypins' land reform of 1906 brought about, unintended, consequences (refer to Sztern 2009 April).

Under the Law of 9 November 1906 the central government positively guaranteed the *household head right to transfer his land strips from communal to personal ownership* (Yaney 1982 p.260). The law stipulated;

*“The actual fulfilment of this right (to leave the commune)... meets practical obstacles in the majority of rural communities....Therefore....it is necessary now to eliminate obstacles in the existing laws to the actual fulfilment of the peasants' right to their allotment land”* (Sidelnikov 1973 quoted in Yaney 1982, p. 260).

As argued above, the legal transformation of the whole system of peasant rights, enabling the exit from the commune, at least formally, freed the individual householder from the daily life obligation to bow to the authority of the communal eldest structure, that is, to the Tsarist bureaucracy and ultimately to the autocracy. The Law of 9 November 1906 not only enabled the transition from collectivism to individualism in the landholding system in a static perspective. Exacerbating the effects of *otkhod* under the maintained commune village system, the 1906 land reform entailed formal emancipation of the young generation household heads from the patriarchal authority of the fathers. The intergenerational emancipation intensified the transition from extended to nuclear household units, which in turn enhanced peasant mobility and migration (Based on Worobec 1995 , Burds 1998). The codified transition from collectivism to individualism in land holding system coupled with the ongoing and intensifying railroad construction, additionally contributed to the increase in the set of individual choices, available in the material and as had been above argued in the spiritual realm. The, ability to *sell the acquired land, albeit within the peasant estate* resulted in structural alterations. Following table illustrates the peasant response to this institutional novelty (Yaney 1982)..

Motives for sale of land given by households in the 1913 government survey. Distribution in (%)

Reasons for sale	Households that sold all their land	Households that sold part of their land
Migration beyond Urals	12.6	2.3
Land purchase elsewhere in European Russia	30.0	12.1
Work in Industry or Services	26.4	14.9
Labour shortage	11.1	22.1
Harvest Failure, Famine, Alcoholism	9.6	24.9
Other reasons	10.3	23.7
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Pallot J 1982 "Social Change and Peasant Land-Holding in Pre-revolutionary Russia, Research Paper 30 p.27.

It is evident from J Pallots 1982 data compilations that the Land Reform of 1906 interacting with the industrialisation process enabled an individual householders' escape from the perils of disadvantageous agricultural conditions through *migration* and *work in the industry*. In the dynamic long run perspective, the individual economic dependency had been reduced. The necessity motivated, organic rationality for peasant collectivism, had thus been challenged (inspired by Vanberg 1994). Simultaneously, the utility of the individualist strategy increased not only due to the formal institutional transformation, that shaped and moulded peasant preferences in its favour (Hodgson 2004, Boyer&Orlean 1993), but also through increased absolute pay offs to individual decision making, strengthening the effects of the Reconstitutive Downwards Causation process (Hodgson 2004). The initiated by the reform, rapid (time range 6-7 years) peasant response in terms of spatial and occupational mobility, altering the social structure in the countryside, indicates that at the time of the novel institutions implementation, the peasant village commune was "ripe for destruction" ( J Pallot 1982, applied Hodgson 2004). Aspects of the Stolypin reform could then be understood as a codification ex post of an ongoing individualisation process (Sztern 1997, 2005). The latter had been formally acknowledged in the law of the 14 June 1910, where former repartitional communes that did not conduct a general land redistribution since 1861, could acquire land titles to the allotment land previously managed in de facto hereditary tenure. The assumption that the commune atrophied had been consistent with Stolypins personal perceptions and expectations (Klimin 2002).

The frequency of peasant petitions for land settlement according to the 9 November 1906 law, points to on one hand the *formal* novelty of the institution inspiring an initial cautious peasant attitude, on the other, the process discloses the peasant unambiguous enthusiasm concerning consolidation and household land ownership (Yaney 1982 p. 275). In 1906 only 600 petitions for land settlement on village land reached the reform agencies. Only a year later, however the same agencies were flooded with 220 000 peasant petitions of which 81 000 contemplated full individualisation of land holding in the formation of *otrubs* and *khutors* (ibid.). In 1908 the total number of peasant petitions reached 386 000 and the Ministry of Internal Affairs MVD noted the popularity of the process (ibid.). It can be surmised that the traditional pre reform commune allowed sufficient elements for individualism within its institutional framework, to informally familiarize the peasant community with the advantages of individual entrepreneurial risk taking and returns on made investments in land (Kingston Mann 1991 Gregory 1994, refer to Sztern 2007).

Yaneys 1982 evidence on the intensity of the petition movement contradicts J Pallots 1999 emphasis on the coercive character of reform implementation and vindicates the assumption on the peasant genuine interest in individual household head land ownership (Sztern 1997, refer to Sztern 2009 April 1). Yaneys 1982 findings indicate a *high degree of voluntarism* accompanying, and determining the outcome of the process (Klimin 2002, Yaney 1982). The implementation of the Stolypin reform caused virtually no revolutionary violence on the part of the peasant constituency (Yaney 1982 p. 187). As regards the non violent coercion, the same source brings into attention that the main cause of peasant fears had been the expected government agencies enforcement of the individualist risk takers land rights, necessitating costly adaptations on the part of the remaining communal peasants. Those fears may have motivated the petitions for village consolidation of the whole communes.

The adversaries in the conflicts in this issues were however the peasant household heads themselves, rather than peasants versus government agencies (Yaney 1982 p.296, Macey 1990). Thus, under the pressure of the reform the communal collectivist structure gave way to additionally intensifying agrarian individualism. The observed by Gaudin 2007 rising during the reform period individual civil cases litigation rate is consistent with this suggestion.

Can it then be concluded that the mutual trust networks – the voluntary collectivist institutions *partially* consolidating the post Emancipation village commune entirely lost their significance in the peasant survival calculus?

This certainly was not the case. The transition from communal to individual rights in land embodied collectivist as well as individualist elements both as regards the practical reform implementation<sup>9</sup> and as regards the processes end results.

The proportion of peasant households entirely withdrawing from the commune displayed outspoken regional variation. Those proportions ranged from 3.7 % in the mid Volga region to 18.3 % in Bogorodskii district, in Tula province in the central black earth belt (Pallot J 1982) .According to the 1913 government survey of 17, 567 households, the average percentage share of households withdrawing from the commune was 7.4% (ibid.).

Activity of households in Bogoroditskii district before and after consolidation. Distribution in (%)

Activity	Before Consolidation	After Consolidation	% Change
Farming	22.6	9.5	<b>-57.8</b>
Migration beyond Urals	6.6	9.2	<b>+40.0</b>
Work in Industry	41.6	46.6	<b>+11.8</b>
No Specified Employment	14.4	23.3	<b>+61.4</b>
Unknown	14.6	11.4	-22.2
Total	100.0	100.0	-

Source:Pallot J 1982 “Social Change and Peasant Land-Holding in Pre-revolutionary Russia, Research Paper 30 p.27.

From J. Pallots data on Bogoroditskii district it can be learned and generalised that land consolidation, i.e. the consolidation of allotment land strips into *khutor* (land parcel consolidated outside of the village) and *otrub* (land parcel consolidated within the village) farms, carrying an ownership title, due to the burden of the physical restructure costs, expected future benefits, and the changed individual entrepreneurial risk distribution as regards the soil quality (based on Pallot J 1982 p, 27-30) *irreversibly* altered the *occupational structure* and migration streams, of the peasant population, per force transforming and modernising the *voluntary* elements of collectivist custom. The propensity to voluntarily cooperate following the choice based on individual utility calculus, increased.

As, on the grass root level authoritarian and autocratic rule in the Tsarist Empire rested on the pre modern tribal institutions (De Madariaga 1998, Hoch 1986), the Stolypin reform increased

<sup>9</sup> Yaney 1982, identifies the conversion of whole communes to hereditary household head ownership under the law of 14 June 1910, such conversion as a result of individual households withdrawal, peasant group land settlement and individual withdrawal. The named forms of land settlement entailed the corresponding levels of communal cooperation.

the surveillance costs (North 1973) of authoritarian control. Simultaneously the long run bargaining power vis á vis the ruler of the remaining in agriculture farmers holding titles to the landed possession, increased, additionally augmenting those costs (Pipes 1994, Martens 2004, North 1973).

It must be emphasized that the 1906 legalisation of peasant individualism did not result in an *atomized* peasant, and former peasant constituency. To the contrary, in the course of the reform implementation the communal rural cooperation mechanisms adjusted to the challenge of land settlement. The individual households' government enabled and enforced withdrawal from the communes, necessitated correcting land redistributions and communal land consolidations. Those processes were based on the formal acknowledgement of individuals rights. The latter per force strengthened the evolution of the *voluntary mechanisms of peasant and former peasant collective action* (Yaney 1982 p.280, refer to Sztern 2007).

The reform, intensifying peasant rural-urban migration as well as migration to other rural locations contributed to the deepening of the necessary *zemliachestvo- landsmen ties* characterising the relationships between *otkhodnics* (Johnson 1979).

The combination of institutionally legalised and additionally enabled (Hodgson 2004) peasant individualism encompassing both the spiritual and the material spheres, *the latter* embodied in the transformation of the landholding system under the Stolypin reform, coupled with refined *mechanisms of collective action*, resulted in the emergence of a gradual, and peaceful element of political power transfer from the ruler to the subjects, exposing the former to a double challenge; through individual property rights in land held by the newly institutionalised citizen community constituting 80 % of the population *and* the ability of his constituency to organize in both rural and the industrialising urban environment. *Zemliachestvo* ties additionally strengthened by rural cooperation mechanisms easily transformed into urban modern trade union activity, as well as into pious opposition groups (Johnson 1979, Martens B 2004, Pipes 1994, Sztern 1994, 1997, 2005, 2007, 2009 April 1 North 1973, Freeze Jun 1996, Boyer and Orlean 1993). The challenge to autocracy posed by the emerging civil society, constituted an unintended consequence of the Stolypin reform (refer to Sztern 2009 April 1).

The state led industrialisation process with railroad construction at its heart, bringing about the *ideological and the religious heterogeneity* of the Tsarist Russian society, forcing (Fig 2) and enabling (Sztern 2008) the legalisation of individual household property rights in land, which entailed the formation of voluntary collective action units, was inconsistent with the perpetuation of the autocratic governance system. The Tsarist Russian Empire embarked on a road to the constitutional monarchy.


Paradoxically, the technological change effectuated through the Tsarist railroad construction, bringing about the democratisation, that is the dissolution of the pious hierarchy, thereby weakening the mutual dependencies between the State and the Orthodox Church (Fig 2), augmented the political stability related significance of the debacle in the 1904 Russo Japanese war. With the religious *and* the military secularised legitimacy base weakened, the Tsarist State had been forced into institutional concessions targeting the creation of an alternative to conquest, *secularised* legitimacy base. The Land Reform aimed at mobilising the *loyal citizen-land owner* support for the Tsarist crown, to the Stolypin government seemed an adequate solution to this problem.

Concluding the above argument the Stolypin land reform in the context of technological change was not consistent with the preservation of autocratic privileges and prerogatives on the part of the Tsarist Crown.

The latter phenomena historically emanated from the Muscovy founding principle; land as the personal *votchina- patrimony* of the ruler, (Pipes 1995). Although Stolypins' land reform 1906 had been intended to function as the stability pillar, ensuring the perpetuation of autocracy, the same process, weakened this structure, in the long run enabling Russia's transformation into constitutional monarchy. The *secularised legitimacy base* (Freeze Jun 1996) in the gradually democratising Empire of the Tsars would be provided by prosperous peasantry. The latter however, had been conditioned upon the perpetuation of peace (based on Ascher 2001).

Russia's engagement in World War I constituted a disastrous to the possibility of peaceful democratisation process, violation of this condition.

Summarising figure III



## References

- Ascher A 2001 “ P.A. Stolypin. The Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia” Stanford University Press Stanford California
- Ascher A 1988 “ The Revolution of 1905. part One Russia In Dissarray . Part II Authority restored” Stanford University Press Stanford California
- Atkinson D 1983”The End of the Russian Land Commune 1905 -1930” Stanford University Press Stanford California
- Bakunin M 1970 “ God and the State” With a New Introduction and Index of Persons by Paul Avrich Dover Publications INC, New York
- Borodkin L.I. 2008 Discussion
- Boyer and Orlean 1993 “How do Conventions Evolve?” In Witt U ed. 1993 “ Evoluton in Markets and Institutions” Physica-Vlg Heidelberg
- Burbank J 2004 “Russian Peasants Go to Court- Legal Culture in The Countryside, 1905-1917” Indiana University Press. Bloomington & Indianapolis
- Burds J1998 “Peasant Dreams and Market Politics, Labour Migration and the Russian Village 1861-1905” University of Pittsburgh Press Pittsburgh P.A.
- Coase R 1937 “ The Firm the Market and the law” The University of Chicago press Chicago London
- Craft N 2007 lecture EHES conference 2007
- Crisp O & Edmondson L 1989 ed.” Civil Rights in Imperial Russia”. Clarendon Press Oxford
- De Madariaga 1998 “Politics and Culture in Eighteenth Century Russia” Longman London and New York
- Dubrovski S.M.1963” Stolypinskaya Zemel’naya Reforma Moscow 1963
- Engelgardt A.N. “Letters From the Country, 1872-1887” Translated and Edited by Cathy A Frierson 1993 Oxford University Press Oxford
- Frank S 1999” Crime, Cultural Conflict and Justice in Rural Russia 1856-1914” University of California Press Berkley
- Freeze G. L.1996 ”Subversive Piety: Religion and the Political Crisis in Late Imperial Russia” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Jun 1996) pp. 308-350, The University of Chicago Press
- Freeze G.L.1999 “Church and Politics in Late Imperial Russia: Crisis and Radicalisation of the Clergy” in Geifman 1999 ed. “Russia under the Last Tsar” Blackwell Publishers

- Frierson C 1990 in Bartlett 1990 "Land Commune and Peasant Community in Russia- Communal Forms in Imperial and Early Soviet Society" Macmillan in Association with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies the University of London
- Frierson C (Spring 1987) "Crime and Punishment in the Russian Village: Rural Concepts of Criminality at the End of the Nineteenth Century" *Slavic Review*, Vol. 46. No1 (Spring 1987) pp 55-69, The American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies
- Gatrell P 1994 "Government, Industry and Rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914- The Last Argument of Tsarism" Cambridge University Press Cambridge
- Gaudin C 2007 " Ruling Peasants – Village and State in Late Imperial Russia" Northern Illinois University Press Dekalb
- Gaudin C 1998 "No Place to Lay My Head. Marginalisation and the Right to Land During the Stolypin reforms" *Slavic Review*, Vol. 57, No. 4 ( Winter, 1988) pp. 747-773
- Gerschenkron A 1962 "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective" The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
- Gerschenkron A 1968 "Continuity in History and Other Essays" The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
- Gregory P 1994 "Before Command. An Economic History of Russia From Emancipation to the First Five Year Plan" Princeton University Press Princeton New Jersey
- Gregory P 1982 "Russian National Income 1885-1913" Cambridge University Press Cambridge
- Greif A 2006 "Institutions and the Path to Modern Economy – Lessons from Medieval Trade" Cambridge University Press
- Hartley 1999 "A Social History of the Russian Empire 1650-1825" Longman London and New York
- Hoch S 1986 "Serfdom and Social Control in Russia Petrovskoe a Village in Tambov" University of Chicago Press Chicago and London
- Hodgson G.M. 2004 "The Evolution of Institutional Economics, Agency Structure and Darwinism in American Institutionalism" Edward Elgar, Cheltenham U K
- Johnson R.E. 1979 "Peasant and Proletarian- The Working Class of Moscow in the Late Nineteenth Century" 1979 Leicester University Press
- Kahan A 1989 "Russian Economic History the Nineteenth Century" ed. by Roger Weiss The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London

Kimball A 1992 "Alexander Herzen and the Native Lineage of the Russian revolution" in Ch.E. Timberlake ed. 1992 "Religious, and Secular Forces in Late Tsarist Russia" University of Washington Press Seattle and London

Kingston Mann E 1991 "Peasant Communes and Economic Innovation a Preliminary Inquiry" in Kingston Mann, E Mixer, T Burds J eds "Peasant Economy Culture and Politics of European Russia" Princeton U.P. Princeton

Klimin I 2002 "Stolypinskaya Agrarnaya Reforma I Stanovlenie Krestian Sobstvennikov V Rossii" Sankt Petersburg

Lawson 1997 "Economics and Reality" Routledge, London and New York

Lenin V.I. 1974 "The Development of Capitalism in Russia" Progress Publishers Moscow 1974

Leonard C S 1990 "Landlords and the Mir: Transaction Costs and Economic Development in Pre Emancipation Russia, Iaroslav Gubernia" in Bartlett R 1990 ed. Land Commune and Peasant Community in Russia - Communal Forms in Imperial and Early Soviet Society" Macmillan in Association with The School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London

Leonard Carol and Jonas Ljungberg 2008 Vol 2 Chapter 5 Population and Living Standards

Lieven D 2000 "Empire. The Russian Empire and Its Rivals" John Murray Albermarle Street London Shevzov 2004 V "Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution" Oxford University Press

Macey 1990 "the Peasant Commune and the Stolypin reforms: Peasant Attitudes, 1906-14" in Bartlett R 1990 ed " Land Commune and Peasant Community in Russia – Communal Forms in Imperial and Early Soviet Society" Macmillan in Association with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. University of London.

Martens B 2004 "the Cognitive Mechanics of Economic Development and Institutional Change" outledge London and New York

Menning B.W. 2000 "Bayonets Before Bullets- The Imperial Russian Army, 1816-1914" Indiana University Press Bloomington & Indianapolis

Milov L 2001 "Velikoruskii Pakhar I Osobennosti Rossijskogo Istoricheskogo Processa"

Mironov B N 2000 "A Social History of Imperial Russia, 1700-1917" Vol I Westview Press

Mironov B.N. 1999 "Socialnaya Istorija Rossii Perioda Imperii (XVIII-NachaloXXv)" genezis Lichnosti Demokraticheskoi Semii Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva I Pravovogo Gosudarstva: v Dwuch Tomach Dimitrij Bulanin St Petersburg.

Moon D 1999 "The Russian Peasantry 1600-1930. The World the Peasants made" Longman London

- Nafziger S 2007 "Land Redistributions and the Russian Peasant Commune in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century" Department of Economics Williams College Williamstown
- Nefedov C.A. "Ob Prichinach Russkoj Revolucii"
- Nelson & Winter 1982 "An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change" The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
- North D.C. 1973 "Västerlandets Uppgång" SNS Förlag Stockholm
- North D.C. 1990 "Institutions Institutional Change and Economic Performance" Cambridge University Press
- North D.C. 2005 "Understanding the Process of Economic Change" Princeton University Press
- Owen T 1995 "Russian Corporate Capitalism from Peter The great to Perestroika" Oxford University Press Oxford New York
- Owen 1991 "The Corporation Under the Russian Law 1800-1917" Cambridge U.P. Cambridge
- Pallot J 1999 "Land Reform in Russia 1906-1917" Peasant Responses to Stolypin's Project of Rural Transformation" Clarendon Press Oxford
- Pallot J 1982 "Social Change and Peasant Land-Holding in Pre-Revolutionary Russia" Research Paper 30 School of Geography University of Oxford
- Pipes R 1995 "Russia Under the Old Regime" Penguin Books , London
- Pipes R 1994 "Property and Freedom" The Harvill Press London
- Raeff M 1984 "Understanding Imperial Russia" Columbia University Press New York
- Simms Y J "The Crisis in the Russian Agriculture at the End of the Nineteenth Century: A Different View" Slavic Review
- Smurova O.V. 2003 "Nezemledelcheski odkhod Krestian v Stolitsu I Ego Vlejanie Na Transformaciu Kulturnoj Tradiciji" Kostroma
- Sztern S 2007 "Collectivism versus Individualism in Russian Peasant Custom 1861-1914. NIE & Evolutionary Institutionalism Interpretations Seen as Complementary"
- Sztern 2000 "The Russian Commune-Village, Obshchina; Its Origins , Function and Character"
- Sztern 2005 "Institutional Transformation in Nineteenth Century Russia. NIE & Evolutionary Economics Interpretations Seen as Complementary"

- Sztern 2008 “The Steam Engine on rail and the Landholding System in Nineteenth Century Russia”
- Sztern 2009 “Peter I Nicolaus II Modernisation Spurts and the Mir- Continuity and Progress- the Combined NIE and Evolutionary Institutionalism Framework applied”
- Sztern 1997 From Obshchina to the Market – and Introduction ussia’s Transition From a Planned to a Market economy in face of pre revolutionary Transitions 1860-1914”
- Timberlake 1992 Ch E “ Introduction : Religious Pluralism, the Spread of Revolutionary Ideas, and the Church-State relationship in Tsarist Russia” in Ch. E Timberlake ed 1992 “Religious and Secular Forces in late Tsarist Russia” University of Washington Press Seattle and London
- Treadgold D.W 1968“ The Peasant and Religion” in W.S. Vucinich 1968 “ The Peasant in Nineteenth Century Russia. Stanford University Press
- Westwood 1964 “A History of the Russian Railways” George Allen and Unwin LTD London
- Worobec C D 2001 “Possessed, Women, Witches, and Demons in Imperial Russia” Northern Illinois University Press
- Worobec C D 1995 “Peasant Russia. Family and Community in the Post Emancipation Period” Northern Illinois University Press
- Worobec C.D. 1990 “ the Post Emancipation Russian Peasant Commune in Orel Province 1861-90 in Bartlett R 1990 ed. “Land Commune and Peasant Community in Russia – Communal Forms in Imperial and Early Soviet Society” Macmillan in Association with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London
- Vanberg V 1994 “Rules and Choice in economics” Routledge, London , New York
- Veblen T 1931” The Theory of the Leisure Class” New York
- Yaney G. 1982 “ The Urge To Mobilize. Agrarian reform in Russia, 1861-1913 University of Illinois Press Urbana Chicago London
- Zakharova L.G. 1992 “Saderzhavie I reformy v Rossii 1861-1874 v Velikie Reformy v Rossii 1856-1874” Zakharova L.G., B Eklöf, Dz Bushnell 1992 eds Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo Universiteta